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ABSTRACT
Modern society’s ever-increasing reliance on technology raises
complex legal challenges. In the search for an eﬃcient and
eﬀective regulatory response, more and more authorities – in
particular the European Union – are relying on alternative
regulatory instruments (ARIs) when engaging big tech companies.
Materially, this is a natural ﬁt: the tech industry is a complex and
rapidly-evolving sector and – unlike the rigid classic legislative
process – ARIs allow for meaningful ex ante anticipatory
constructions and ex post enforcement due to their unique
ﬂexibility. However, from a territorial point of view several
complications arise. Although the use of codes of conduct to
regulate transnational private actors has a rich history, the way in
which such codes are set out under articles 40 and 41 of the EU’s
GDPR implies a ‘hardening’ of these soft law instruments that has
repercussions for their relationship to the principles of territorial
jurisdiction. This contribution serves as a ﬁrst step for further
research into the relationship between codes of conduct, the
regulation of the tech industry and the territorial aspects related
thereto.
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1. Introduction
The services oﬀered by tech companies such as Google, Amazon and Apple have
become inseparable from modern life, be it for professional or personal use.
However, the rapid rise of these tech and data-driven corporations as powerful econ-
omic actors operating on a global stage has created serious legal challenges, such as
questions on how (and whether) to deal with online hate speech (Faiola 2016),
massive data breaches (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018) and deceptive data col-
lection practices.1 Although similar controversies have existed for some time now, the
massive scope of these recent scandals has caused national legislators to fully realise
that the information and communication technology (ICT) sector might require a
rethinking of how regulation is approached.
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After all, materially speaking, the ICT industry oﬀers a fast-evolving and highly technical
environment that challenges the ability of the law-making process to keep up with rapidly
evolving technologies (pacing problem) (Cave, Marsden, and Simmons 2008), tests the
knowledge possessed by regulators to make informed decisions on extremely complex
or technical matters (knowledge problem) (Gervais 2010) and showcases the potentially
negative repercussions that a rigid regulatory environment can have on innovation (instru-
ment failure) (Black 2002).
Territorially speaking, the tech industry oﬀers another challenge that is perhaps even
more daunting: political jurisdictional boundaries no longer succeed in containing these
immaterial and essentially borderless services, resulting in a sort of ‘deterritorialization’
(Barkan 2013, 87) that allows tech actors to shape to a large degree the debate on
which norms they should be subjected to (Kilovaty 2019; Peng 2018). This leads to national
authorities facing jurisdictional issues when seeking to regulate or enforce rules.
Against this background, it is crucial to note that the rise of the ‘new governance’ phil-
osophy (de Búrca and Scott 2006) and the prospect of ‘smart regulation’ (Gunningham and
Rees 1997; Gunningham and Sinclair 2017) has resulted in more and more state authorities
involving a broader scope of actors (such as private enterprises, NGOs and interest groups)
in the regulatory process, in what some scholars have dubbed ‘the twilight of the tra-
ditional regulatory system’ (de Búrca and Scott 2006; Hagemann, Skees, and Thierer
2019; Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). The terms ‘self-regulation’ and ‘co-regulation’ are often
used to describe such regulation that deviates from traditional legislation, with the
former indicating the creation and implementation of rules by a group of actors – industry
in particular – with minimal or no intervention by the state (Bartle and Vass 2005, 19;
Lievens 2010). The latter, on the other hand, describes constructions that link non-state
regulatory systems to state regulation (Hans Bredow Institute 2006) by relying on
private entities to perform a variety of government functions, with state authorities provid-
ing oversight and enforcement (Rubinstein 2010).
Nonetheless, as scholars continued studying the dimensions of governance-beyond-
government, it emerged that these terms are too rudimentary to adequately capture
the complex interrelationships between state and non-state actors that exist in nearly
every policy domain. Instead, to more accurately convey the many possible actor conﬁgur-
ations, we will speak of ‘decentered or polycentric regulatory regimes’ (Black 2008). This is
used in conjunction with the term ‘alternative regulatory instruments’ (ARIs) to refer to the
regulatory output of such regimes that cannot be classiﬁed as traditional legislation. After
all, regulatory scholars have concluded that regulation operates on a continuum according
to the degree of involvement by the myriad of actors that can be active in a given domain
(Lievens 2010; Prosser 2008, 101).
By making the conceptual choice for ARIs instead of ‘self-regulation’ and ‘co-regulation’,
we recognise on the one hand the impossibility of comprehensively classifying the extre-
mely broad range of tools that allow for the decentralisation of regulatory authority
among public, private and public-private actors and institutions (i.e. a positive deﬁnition
of the broad range of forms in which regulatory instruments other than traditional legis-
lation can manifest themselves) (Abbott 2013; Lievens 2011, 171) while on the other hand
denoting the status of such tools as any instrument that oﬀers an ‘alternative’ to traditional
top-down command-and-control state-issued legislation (i.e. a negative deﬁnition of what
ARIs are not) (Figure 1).2
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The use of ARIs has speciﬁcally been promoted at the level of the European Union,
forming one of the pillars of the European Commission’s policy agenda (European Com-
mission 2001) and appearing in a wide range of documents, such as the 2003 and 2016
Interinstitutional agreements on better lawmaking, the Better Regulation Guidelines (Euro-
pean Commission 2017c) and its accompanying toolbox (European Commission 2017b).
This has led to the EU explicitly integrating stakeholder participation in legislative instru-
ments. A major example thereof is the European Union’s 2016 General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) which modernises the EU’s previous personal data protection frame-
work established in the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD). Although the DPD already
pioneered the use of ARIs by promoting codes of conduct in its article 27, the GDPR
expands upon that template by devoting two extensive articles on codes (articles 40
and 41 GDPR).3 The GDPR explicitly states that codes are ‘intended to contribute to
proper application’ of the GDPR by specifying the concrete application of a non-exhaustive
list of data protection principles and topics. It is therefore clear that the European legislator
considers ARIs – and codes of conduct in particular – important tools to implement the
personal data protection standards set out in the main provisions of the GDPR.
This contribution will ﬁnd that the increasing use of ARIs should be encouraged from a
material point of view due to their unique characteristics that make them well-suited to
the technical complexity and rapid changes oﬀered by an industry reliant on innovation
and emerging technologies (Section 2). However, from a territorial point of view it will
argue that, while codes of conduct have traditionally been the instrument of choice to
regulate transnational corporations (TNCs), a ‘hardening’ of this soft law instrument is
taking place under the GDPR that complicates their jurisdictional characteristics (Section
3). The conclusion brieﬂy elaborates on the possible repercussions thereof, both within
the EU and beyond its borders.
2. Complex, rapidly-evolving industries and ARIs: a natural ﬁt
It has been mentioned above that the use of traditional legislation to regulate a sector as
technically complex and rapidly-evolving as the tech industry is inevitably confronted with
the pacing and knowledge problems and concerns regarding instrument failure, but it
deserves to be elucidated that these are not isolated issues; they are interrelated and
reinforce each other. For example, scholars note that the traditional legislative process
Figure 1. The regulatory continuum (Lievens 2010, 229).
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might never be able to keep up with the speed of today’s innovation (Ranchordás 2015;
Stylianou 2011). This not only exacerbates the aforementioned knowledge problem
(Cohen 2016, 397)4 but both problems also mutually reinforce each other. The legislation
that is produced as a result may cause high opportunity costs (Ellig and McLaughlin 2012;
Huber 1983, 1027) as well as compliance costs that potentially scare oﬀ existing actors and
demoralise new market entrants (Brill 2011, 18; Mândrescu 2017).
This is not to paint a completely bleak picture of traditional legislation. In fact, top-down
regulation has many unique strengths: it is perceived as predictable and binding (Commis-
sion of the European Communities 2001), it possesses democratic legitimacy due to its
origins in elected legislative organisms (Prosser 2008) and an extensive and established
apparatus provides for the enforcement of rules. Nonetheless, the diﬃculty of traditional
legislation to foresee in rules that are both ex ante suﬃciently protective of consumers and
dynamic enough to allow industry innovation, render it a sub-optimal tool to regulate the
rapid and unpredictable evolutions of the tech industry.
For this reason, the use of ARIs to consciously utilise the variety of actors in polycentric
regulatory environments is an advantageous way forward. From a material point of view,
such multi-stakeholder involvement not only helps manage the complexity of multi-actor
interactions in the regulatory process but also takes advantage of their diversity in knowl-
edge and resources (Marsden et al. 2013, 20). This can lead to a higher degree of expertise
when drafting rules (Bonnici 2008; De Haan 2013; McLaughlin 2013) as well as lower regu-
latory costs due to a more streamlined institutional environment compared to the more
rigid, diﬀuse and time-consuming legislative process. Since ARIs are not the product of
strict government-based procedures and structures (Hagemann, Skees, and Thierer
2019, 5) but instead decentralise ‘regulatory authority among public, private and public-
private actors and institutions… [they] can be adopted and revised more rapidly than
formal regulations’ (Abbott 2013, 6).
Ex ante, this opens up the important possibility of taking informed anticipatory action to
address emerging issues and present user-focused solutions, while still oﬀering a nimble
ruleset that can address unexpected evolutions, is tailored to the needs of the sector in
question, and avoids the unnecessary stiﬂing of innovation (Armitage, Cordova, and
Siegel 2017). Ex post, from the perspective of compliance, the use of ARIs can also
correct the situation under traditional legislation whereby enforcement authorities
choose to ignore or operate beyond rules that they feel are outdated or inﬂexible (Hage-
mann, Skees, and Thierer 2019, 35). Instead, when designing and monitoring an ARI
through a multi-stakeholder process, these authorities have a place at the negotiation
table where they can at any time – including after the implementation of the rules –
suggest changes to the instrument, allowing enforcement mechanisms to quickly adapt
to an evolving situation. As advanced by Ayres and Braithwaite, such multi-stakeholder
processes lead to more balanced and durable regulation while also providing public
accountability (Ayres and Braithwaite 1995). Additionally, the focus that ARIs place on
relationship building, the gathering and exchanging of information, agenda setting, brain-
storming and consensus building, oﬀers the possibility to change adversarial relations into
cooperative ones (Marsden et al. 2013; Susskind et al. 2003), thereby easing the tensions
between public policy goals and corporate interests (Kobrin 1977). Finally, the creation of a
monitoring body with strong investigative and sanctioning powers has the potential to
oﬀer stakeholders and consumers an eﬀective compliant mechanism that functions
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faster than traditional courts, while simultaneously unburdening those courts from such
speciﬁc complaints (SCOPE Europe 2019).
Nonetheless, a high degree of involvement by non-state actors coupled to a low degree
of involvement by state actors (i.e. a regime that veers towards the right side of the con-
tinuum) can be perceived as democratically deﬁcient due to the more limited transpar-
ency and accountability compared to top-down legislation (Latzer et al. 2013;
Rubinstein 2018). There is also the risk of ‘regulatory bias’, i.e. that only aspects are regu-
lated that are advantageous to the industry actors themselves (Segal 2001). Finally, weak
oversight and enforcement might lead to ‘free riders’: actors who violate the rules go
unpunished due to a lack of enforcement, while actors who fully comply suﬀer market dis-
advantages due to said compliance (Campbell 1999).
If both state and non-state actors are involved to a large degree in a regulatory con-
struction (i.e. a regime that looks for the middle ground on the continuum), the advan-
tages of self-regulatory systems and top-down systems are potentially combined. The
former provides a ﬂexible and adaptable framework that is built on the expertise and
involvement of interest groups and enterprises, while the latter adds more legal certainty
and democratic legitimacy (Schulz and Held 2004). Furthermore, the opportunity for
private actors to negotiate about rules is said to lead to increased compliance rates due
to a sense of ownership over the rulemaking process (Rubinstein 2010) while a govern-
ment safety net in case of non-compliance remains present at all times (Csink and
Mayer 2014, 406). However, since such a combination potentially creates and/or maintains
both an industry-based ecosystem and a governmental regulatory system side-by-side,
there could essentially be a duplication of the institutional environment (Palzer and
Scheuer 2002, 7). This creates an increase in systemic costs (Palzer and Scheuer 2002)
and the opacity of such a system can reduce consumer conﬁdence (Segal 2001), compli-
cate oversight and potentially lead to abuse of the system.5 Care must be taken to avoid an
accumulated volume of rules that becomes overly large or complex (Mitchell 2017), which
not only leads to an increasingly less rational and ﬂexible mass (Rauch 1999, 152) but also
provides an opportunity for industry leaders to shield themselves from newmarket players
(Taylor 2016). This also opens the door to the opposite situation of the ‘knowledge
problem’; instead of a lack of knowledge on the part of the policymakers, the output of
highly specialised multi-stakeholder groups in technical sectors might be incomprehensi-
ble to outsiders. This could be called the ‘specialist problem’, if you will, and it risks that
experts in a ﬁeld become so entrenched in their position that they actively seek to
protect their status by resisting a simpliﬁcation of complex rules (Olson 1982).
Additionally, ARIs are not always perceived as oﬀering the same high level of legal
certainty that top-down legislation does (Stern 2016, 181) since they can be rapidly
adapted, may feature complex interdependencies between actors and generally lack a
central authority (Black 2008, 140). This reveals the paradox of hard law: although
slow and cumbersome procedures are unﬁt to regulate rapidly-evolving emerging tech-
nology markets, rigid rules are welcomed by investors as a way to achieve predictable
outcomes and engage in risk mitigation (Knight 2016). To truly prove their strength over
traditional legislation, ARIs should therefore build in strong enforcement mechanisms
that dispel all doubts as to their capacity to legally challenge scenarios where an
actor feels that they have suﬀered damages through a violation of the rules. This will
also fortify the perceived legitimacy of ARIs, since it can be argued that legitimacy is
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not only gained by process, but equally by whether or not violations are dealt with
(Weiser 2017). Questions surrounding territorial legitimacy are a diﬀerent matter; they
will be treated under Section 3 (see below).
ARIs also face the ‘democratic challenge’ which Black describes as questions such as
who should be involved in decision-making structures and how accountability should
be guaranteed (Black 2008, 141). In this regard, constructive technology assessments
(CTAs) oﬀer a way forward. This assessment technique seeks to achieve a more reﬂexive
co-evolution of technology and society by bridging the separation between the develop-
ment of a technology and societal uptake and use (Rip 2002, 2018). This is not merely done
through anticipation – for example by taking into account path dependency theory – but
also through a process of feedback and learning by way of workshops that gather both the
developers of the technology in question and a variety of actors that are external to its
development (Schot and Rip 1997). Such an anticipatory approach involving ‘outsiders’
not only increases the societal legitimacy of new technologies, but can also help avoid
risks or consequences that the developers of the technology would not foresee them-
selves due to their position within an ‘enactment frame’ that steers the perception that
society poses a ‘challenge’ that the technology in question must overcome (Garud and
Ahlstrom 1997). The recent surge of interest in the societal eﬀects of algorithmic
decision-making has revived scholarly work surrounding this topic and can serve as inspi-
ration for policymakers as they further consider and implement ARIs (see, for example:
Burk 2019; Green and Viljoen 2019).
In any event, the advantages that ARIs oﬀer to govern rapidly-evolving and complex
sectors when compared to traditional law-making are important. Their ﬂexibility oﬀers the
possibility of eﬀective ex ante and ex post strategies, while the involvement of a broad
range of actors including civil society and industry will generally also lead to a higher
quality of rulemaking that resists the short-sighted solutions that both traditional legislation
or pure self-regulation might lead to. With regard to thematerial features of tech actors, the
well-considered use of ARIs by policymakers can thus clearly oﬀer important beneﬁts.
3. ARIs and globally operating actors – the complex question of
jurisdiction
Similar to the growing unease that top-down regulation is unable to adequately materially
regulate tech companies, a parallel challenge has been noticeable for several decades now
regarding the territorial challenges traditional legislation faces to eﬀectively regulate cor-
porate actors who conduct cross-border operations. This section will argue that challenges
posed by transnational corporations are in se nothing new, but that the borderless nature
of the internet accentuates the problem (3.1). Additionally, the EU’s response thereto
through codes of conduct might seem to create a successful jurisdictional regime at
ﬁrst glance, but in fact complicates the relationship between such instruments and their
territorial features (3.2).
3.1 Transnational actors and territorial jurisdiction
To fully understand the territorial challenges posed by transnational corporations (TNCs) it
is important to consider the historical background. After the decolonisation wave of the
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1960s, the newly-independent developing self-titled Third World countries started being
considered as both emerging markets and opportunities for production sites by mostly-
Western companies. These large incumbents either commenced new operations or
used mergers and acquisitions to form global structures (Willets 2001), thereby establish-
ing a trend toward a transnationalised global political economy, a removal of trade barriers
and the liberalisation of markets (Thiel and Maslanik 2010, 5). Already in 1975, this led to
scholars such as Ball noting that ‘the political boundaries of nation states are too narrow
and constrictive to provide adequate scope for modern, large-scale economic activities’
(Ball 1975). More recent literature in the ﬁeld of governance notes that transnational
decentred regulatory regimes are indeed characterised by an absence of a central locus
of control and responsibility (Black 2008, 139–140). Since such regimes develop outside
of both domestic law and international law systems (Stewart 2004), it is challenging to
situate them within traditional legal and territorial jurisdictional boundaries (Skelcher
2005) and within traditional principal-agent relationships (Black 2008, 143). This results
in an empowerment of non-state actors to exert inﬂuence on the global political
economy to the detriment of state power (Strange 1996; Willets 2001), potentially allowing
TNCs to escape from external scrutiny and possible sanctions (i.e. the concept of ‘account-
ability’) (Bovens 2007).
As a result of the far-reaching inﬂuence TNCs had on local economic and political situ-
ations, the Third World countries started considering their presence as detrimental to
sovereignty and national development (Jenkins 2001, 2). After all, such companies
gained massive revenue by quickly dominating a new marketplace, with the host
country receiving little to no beneﬁts. Realising that individual national measures would
not meaningfully change the behaviour of corporate giants, the countries pressured inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and the International Labor Organisation (ILO) to issue codes
of conduct that stipulated the behaviour expected of these corporate actors, regardless
of where they deployed their operations (International Labor Organisation 1977; Organis-
ation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1976).
Although there is no universally accepted deﬁnition of what codes of conduct are –
which is the case for most soft law instruments due to their ﬂuidity6 – we can construct
a working deﬁnition based upon several elements common to scholarly work on the
topic: codes of conduct aim to stipulate the desirability of a certain conduct by States,
international or non-governmental organisations or private associations and persons (Frie-
drich 2010), with codes aimed at corporations speciﬁcally seeking to enhance the account-
ability of such actors in the (international) marketplace (Keller 2008, 4) by deﬁning
voluntary standards and principles to steer the behaviour of similar types of enterprises
(i.e. a certain sector) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1999;
Robinson et al. 2009b).
Two facets of codes deserve further elucidation here. First, some scholars make a dis-
tinction between types of codes depending on the actor that designed them, with
Beckers stating that ‘private codes’ are ‘codes of conduct that have been developed by
private actors’ and ‘public codes’ are ‘developed in the public (international organis-
ations)… sphere’ (Beckers 2018, 569, 573). We will employ this diﬀerentiation throughout
the rest of the contribution. Second, since codes present vague, open norms that are non-
binding but rather voluntary in nature, they must be diﬀerentiated from the precise and
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binding rules that traditional hard law imposes. After all, as Abbott and Snidal argue,
instruments become ‘soft’ from the moment that ‘legal arrangements are weakened
along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation’ (Abbott
and Snidal 2000, 422).
This recognition of codes of conduct as being soft law instruments has important ter-
ritorial repercussions. The principle of state sovereignty that still forms the very foun-
dation of the international legal order grants a state the right of exercising authority
within a speciﬁc territory (Milanovic 2011, 8) with the logical consequence that states –
even when working through international organisations – must respect the sovereign
equality (Article 2(1) United Nations 1945) and independence of other states (United
Nations 1946, 1947, 1949). However, since codes do not impose precise and binding
norms, there is no overt threat to state sovereignty and equality, freeing them from
the territorial conﬁnes that national legislative instruments must respect (Keller 2008,
5) and allowing them to construct a transnational normative regime that does not contra-
dict the principles of public international law.7 Therefore, although the eﬀects of the
1970s codes designed by IGOs ultimately proved limited, they nonetheless achieved an
important innovation in the regulation of private actors conducting cross-border
operations.
However, modern corporate tech behemoths pose an even greater challenge to achiev-
ing eﬀective transborder regulatory constructions since the products they oﬀer are imma-
terial, essentially borderless and no longer rely on physical supply chains, instead
operating through the decentralised and worldwide network that is the internet. Addition-
ally, whereas many other policy issues with a global impact have treaties and international
institutions acting as overseers in place (think of the WTO and its ruleset for trade) there
are few global rules and no relevant international institutions where digital issues are con-
cerned (Goodman 2020). Although many states seem to agree that there is a need to
impose jurisdiction and global standards on tech companies, states have competing ideol-
ogies and interests that result in disagreement on what regulation should look like (Brad-
ford 2007, 413–422). The failure of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts in
2017 to deliver a uniﬁed view on internet governance is telling of how diﬀerent viewpoints
around the globe are. The WTO does not oﬀer any solutions either since privacy falls
outside of its ruleset and dispute settlement mechanism (Shaﬀer 2000, 50). Issues concern-
ing tech actors consequently transcend the regulatory grasp of both national and inter-
national authorities: the former because of its territorial limitations, and the latter due
to a lack of international consensus on possible solutions. The resulting international
power vacuum has led tech companies to openly counter national governments (Eichen-
sehr 2019) and determine to a signiﬁcant extent for themselves the global tech norms they
wish to obey (Kilovaty 2019; Peng 2018). This process of norm entrepreneurship caused
Cohen to remark that ‘dominant platforms’ role in the international legal order increas-
ingly resembles that of sovereign states’ (Cohen 2017, 199). This theory slots in with the
already existing accountability gap that exists where smaller hosts states are unable to
enforce legal obligations on large multinational corporations whose turnover vastly over-
shadows their national budgets (Kamminga 2004, 425) – a fact that also holds true for tech
companies.8
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3.2 GDPR codes of conduct: a countermove that complicates codes’ territorial
features
Nonetheless, it can be observed that the EU attempts to counter these trends, chieﬂy
through its renewed data protection framework the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). Article 3 of the Regulation signiﬁcantly extends the territorial scope of the EU’s
data protection framework as compared to the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD),
the legislative predecessor to the GDPR. According to the European Data Protection
Board, this wider territorial scope is justiﬁable to ensure comprehensive protection of
data subject rights in the EU as well as to provide a level playing ﬁeld for companies
that operate in EU markets (European Data Protection Board 2018, 4). Keeping this in
mind, it is particularly interesting to turn towards articles 40 and 41 GDPR where the
use of codes of conduct is encouraged ‘to contribute to the proper application’ of the
GDPR by way of ‘specifying the application of this Regulation’ (article 40, paragraph 1
and 2 GDPR). Although codes were already featured in article 27 of the DPD, their
implementation was considered lacklustre (European Commission 2010, 12; Robinson
et al. 2009a, 9) on account of tensions between enterprises and authorities and the man-
datory and slow nature of the procedures involved in the process (Korﬀ 2002, 240; Robin-
son et al. 2009a, 39). Tellingly, in the more than twenty years that the DPD was in force,
only two EU-wide codes of conduct were ever approved.9
The GDPR consciously tackles these issues in a number of ways, as will be made clear
below. However, this contribution will argue that as a result of this push to ‘do better’, a
‘juridiﬁcation’ of these codes (or, as authors have also called it, a ‘hardening’ (Traversa
and Flamini 2015)) is taking place that has important repercussions for the relationship
between codes and the principles of territorial jurisdiction. The term ‘juridiﬁcation’
refers to ‘the transformation within legalised governance arrangements from soft into
hard law [meaning] that “softer” norms are changed to become part of the legal system
by being subjected to the distinction within the legal system between legal and illegal’
(Beckers 2018, 572). Such a ‘hardening’ of GDPR codes takes place along all three dimen-
sions of law as identiﬁed and cited earlier by Abbott and Snidal.
First, there is the dimension of obligation. Codes are traditionally voluntary rulesets; they
set out non-binding standards and principles (Keller 2008, 3–4; Robinson et al. 2009a, 8)
and as a result it remains up to each individual enterprise in a sector whether or not it
wishes to commit to the rules laid out in a code. However, the EU intimately intertwines
the GDPR (a hard law instrument) and codes (a soft law instrument) by emphasising
that codes are a means to demonstrate compliance with the hard law they are encapsu-
lated in. This is strikingly demonstrated by article 83, 2 (j) GDPR which sets out that ‘[w]hen
deciding whether to impose an administrative ﬁne and deciding on the amount… due
regard shall be given to… adherence to approved codes of conduct.’ Although this tech-
nique is a response to the EU’s previous ﬁnding that ‘[t]he absence of genuinely dissuasive
and punitive sanctions’ is a major weak point of codes (Working Party on the Protection of
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 1998, 4) and ﬁndings by authors
such as Karns and Mingst that TNC regulation traditionally has been weak on account of
the voluntary nature of such codes (Karns and Mingst 2010) such a repurposing of codes of
conduct as a liability reduction mechanism to inﬂuence the amount or even the very impo-
sition of ﬁnes de facto forces corporations to participate in them, since the enterprise
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otherwise exposes itself to a higher risk of ﬁnes or a risk of higher ﬁnes. Companies will
thus no longer participate in codes because they are formed in ‘the shadow of the
state’ (Abbott, Marchant, and Corley 2012) and could potentially pre-empt binding legis-
lation (Ascoly and Zeldenrust 1998, 45; Hirsch 2011, 460–464; Rubinstein 2018, 3) but
rather because they are directly linked to punitive hard law provisions. The fact that com-
pliance is thus presented as a condition to receive a legal beneﬁt (Beckers 2018, 576)
places a ﬁnancial and punitive pressure on corporations that raises questions about
whether or not the EU is overstepping its powers or violating the rights of business.
More research is necessary to come to a conclusion on those points, but for the
purpose of this contribution it should be clear that the non-binding dimension of codes
of conduct has seen a drastic hardening by linking adherence to codes to the imposition
and determination of hard law-based ﬁnes.
The dimension of precision also sees a marked hardening. Codes of conduct are tra-
ditionally carriers of ‘open’ norms, i.e. imprecise broad goals that oﬀer corporations discre-
tion in how to implement them (Michael 1996, 544). The opposite holds true for the
GDPR’s approach: it posits broad hard law provisions and determines that codes are
meant to specify those provisions by oﬀering prescriptive and speciﬁc solutions that
can result in compliance. This is also evidenced by recital 98, which stipulates that
codes of conduct should be used ‘so as to facilitate the eﬀective application of this Regu-
lation… In particular, such codes of conduct could calibrate the obligations of controllers
and processors’. Article 40 paragraph 2 is even more explicit, determining that codes may
be created ‘for the purpose of specifying the application of this Regulation’ and sub-
sequently oﬀering a non-exhaustive list of topics and principles that are the subject of
the GDPR’s main provisions. In its guidelines on codes, the European Data Protection
Board (EDPB) further states that codes should ‘codify how the GDPR shall apply in a
speciﬁc, practical and precise manner. The agreed standards and rules will need to be
unambiguous, concrete, attainable and enforceable’ (European Data Protection Board
2019a, 15). By embedding codes of conduct directly into hard law provisions and consid-
ering them a tool to specify its binding obligations, they are used contrary to their original
goal as a means of expressing broad and open-ended intentions (Rubinstein 2018, 505).
Once again, a hardening of codes of conduct can be perceived, this time along the dimen-
sion of precision.
Lastly, there is the dimension of delegation. As described by Abbott et al., this dimension
entails that third parties are given authority to implement and enforce a rule, for example
when administrative and judicial authorities interpret and extend broad principles (Abbott
and Snidal 2000, 433; Abbott et al. 2000, 408). This is how hard law traditionally functions:
an instrument sets out legal principles, which are then interpreted, implemented and
enforced by a range of authorities. This stands in contrast to the typical reliance of
codes of conduct on non-judicial monitoring mechanisms that oﬀer advice or make
non-binding decisions. This too changes under the GDPR. Firstly, the submission pro-
cedure that was optional for EU-wide codes under the text of the DPD has now been
made obligatory by article 40 paragraph 7 for codes relating to processing activities in
several Member States. A national authority must be chosen by the code owner, which
then triggers the obligation for this authority to elect two co-reviewing supervisory auth-
orities (SAs). Additionally, an approved draft must also await the opinion of the European
Data Protection Board (the so-called ‘consistency opinion’) (European Data Protection
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Board 2019b) before the national authority can decide whether or not approval is ulti-
mately granted. Moreover, articles 64 and 65 set out the authoritative status of the
Board’s opinion, the need for the original SA to explain why they would diverge from
the Board’s opinion, and a dispute resolution procedure by the Board. The delegation tech-
niques do not end there, since article 41, paragraph 2 provides stipulations on the pro-
cedures and structures that monitoring bodies must foresee in. Regarding codes on a
national level, ﬁnally, paragraphs 5 through 9 of article 40 concern the role of the national
supervisory authorities, who are tasked with the approval and registration of codes,
possess the power to accredit monitoring bodies or revoke such accreditation, and
decide on the suspension or exclusion of participants to a code (article 41 GDPR, para-
graphs 3 through 5). The GDPR thus clearly engages in delegation, which diminishes
the decentralised, non-governmental nature of codes of conduct and dilutes their coop-
erative character (Michael 1996, 541–542).
Such a ‘hardening’of codes of conduct severely complicates the normally uncomplicated
relationship that they enjoywith territoriality. After all, it is their characteristics of presenting
open and voluntary norms that are not subjected to delegation to administrative and judi-
cial authorities that allows them to set up a transnational normative regime that does not
contradict the principles of public international law (Keller 2008, 5). As argued by writers
such as Willets, a move towards the harmonisation of standards and joint policies from a
desire to regulate markets ‘does not represent the successful exercise of sovereignty over
companies: it is the partial surrender of sovereignty to an intergovernmental body’
(Willets 2001). This argument becomes all the more convincing when scholars’ ﬁndings
are taken into account that international organisations such as the EU ‘undoubtedly exert
a signiﬁcant degree of inﬂuence over state governments, with a resulting “transnationaliza-
tion” of domestic policies’ (Thiel and Maslanik 2010, 15), expanding the notion of ‘domestic
policy’ through regularised policy coordination by a variety of organisations in a multilevel
governance system (Hurrelmann and DeBardeleben 2011). Moreover, the repercussions
may be felt beyond the borders of the EU, a fact acknowledged by the EDPB itself in its
guidelines on codes of conduct where it states that codes may have an impact on ‘the
level of protection which the GDPR provides to the wider international community’ (Euro-
peanData Protection Board 2019a, 10). In a globalised and interconnectedworld, it is indeed
nearly inevitable that a variety of state and non-state actors beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the EU will be impacted to some degree by codes of conduct.
4. Conclusion
From a territorial point of view, this contribution has focussed extensively on codes of
conduct since this particular soft law instrument is traditionally chosen to regulate trans-
national corporations on account of their ability to construe transnational normative
regimes that do not violate the principles of public international law. However, there
are indications that the GDPR’s approach to codes results in a ‘hardening’ of these soft
law tools among the dimensions of precision, obligation and delegation. The repercus-
sions of such an evolution are two-pronged. First, there is the argument put forward by
authors such as Willets cited above that it results in a diminishing of EU member states’
sovereignty to the beneﬁt of the EU. Although this paper does not render judgment on
this being a positive or negative development, it is certainly a reality that should be
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taken into account. Indeed, research at the turn of millennium already concluded that the
EU often lets political non-binding instruments gradually acquire legal connotations to
attain more inﬂuence (Alter 2000).
Second, whereas the use of codes to set up transnational normative regimes is in com-
pliance with the principles of international law due to their ‘soft’ characteristics, hardened
codes would imply that the EU sets up a binding transnational regulatory regime beyond
its territorial jurisdiction. On one hand, we could justify this by referring to the ‘Brussels
eﬀect’: the EU’s market power and institutional characteristics enable it to engage in uni-
lateral regulatory globalisation, i.e. the ability to ‘externalize its laws and regulations
outside its borders through market mechanisms, resulting in the globalization of stan-
dards’ (Bradford 2015, 3). As conceded by the US authorities themselves, the diverse
array of hard law directives and regulations of the EU are aimed at the EU member
states and private actors active within the European Single Market and cannot be con-
sidered extraterritorial legislative overreach (Platt Majoras 2001, 14). Their external
eﬀects simply ﬂow ‘directly from the EU’s pursuit of its internal goals… [They are] inciden-
tal externalities’ (Bradford 2015, 42).
On the other hand, we already have a case study on hardened codes under the auspices
of the Union: the EU code of conduct on business taxation. Scholars have critiqued this
public code as being a ‘disingenuous’ hybrid regulatory regime and have pleaded for
more transparent constructions where hard law and soft law operate in parallel to fully
realise their respective and distinct strengths (Seeruthun-Kowalczyk 2012). However,
where that code was aimed at the EU member states, GDPR codes are diﬀerent since
they seek to inﬂuence the conduct of private actors – many of whom are American com-
panies. Although the borderless nature of internet services indeed presents a signiﬁcant
challenge to regulate eﬀectively – let alone eﬀectively and in full conformity with the prin-
ciples of territorial jurisdiction – it could equally be called ‘disingenuous’ to adopt binding
rules under the guise of uncontroversial, seemingly intra-EU soft law instruments to
change corporate practices on a global level. Such a practice raises the spectre of ‘Euro-
pean legislative imperialism’ – an argument mostly put forward by American authors
who see the control that the EU attempts to exert over mainly US-based companies as ille-
gitimate and imperialistic (Kogan 2004; Layton 2018).
Leaving aside the territorial quandaries, the use of codes of conduct in an increasingly
‘hard’ way would also risk diminishing the unique characteristics identiﬁed above that
make them so materially suited to regulate the tech industry. It is precisely their ‘soft’
nature that allows them to ‘adapt more rapidly to changing marketplace circumstances,
stakeholder input, and changing political headwinds’ (Hagemann, Skees, and Thierer
2019, 38). If they are overly bound by the same constraints that characterise hard law,
this valuable ﬂexibility and adaptability might be lost. And in our modern society,
where constant, unforeseeable technological evolutions increasingly shape our economic
and social landscape, few things can be considered more valuable.
Notes
1. Facebook was accused of deceptive data gathering through the ‘Facebook Research’ VPN app
(See: Constine 2019). Google allegedly did so through the ‘Screenwise Meter’ app (See: Whit-
taker, Constine, and Lunden 2019).
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2. See tool #18 in European Commission (2017a).
3. The GDPR also encourages the use of certiﬁcation mechanisms in articles 42 and 43. Scholarly
literature, however, debates whether certiﬁcation can be considered an ARI. For the sake of
brevity and clarity, this contribution therefore does not focus on certiﬁcation.
4. See already in 1959: Lindblom (1959).
5. For example by industry leaders and specialists in the ﬁeld. See infra for a deeper discussion.
6. See the European Commission’s remark that ‘it is often hard to deﬁne the exact nature of a
given soft regulatory approach’ (European Commission 2017a, 88). See also how the Article
29 Working Party equates ‘recommended practices’ to codes of conduct in (Article 29
Working Party 2001, 3) The terms ‘codes of conduct’ and ‘codes of ethics’ are used inter-
changeably by consultancy ﬁrm Deloitte: (Deloitte 2005).
7. Keller (n 74) 5.
8. See the dominant position in which Facebook and Google ﬁnd themselves vis-à-vis host state
Ireland and its lead national data protection enforcer acknowledging the wish to avoid costly
lawsuits against these companies, as described in Vinocur (2019).
9. Respectively the ‘European Code of conduct for the use of personal data in direct marketing’
by FEDMA (Federation of European Direct and Interactive Marketing) in 2003 and its long-
gestating 2010 Annex, and ‘Recommended Practice 1774 – Protection for privacy and trans-
border data ﬂows of personal data used in international air transport of passengers and of
cargo’ by IATA (International Air Transport Association) – with the caveat added by the
Article 29 Working Party itself that the latter does not strictly qualify as a Community code
of conduct in the sense of Article 27 (3).
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